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This paper deals with suboptimal control policies in differential games. Suflicient 
conditions for advantageous trategies of either player are examined for a linear- 
quadratic game in which the players are constrained to use suboptimal control laws 
of specified form. The concept of a “bargaining matrix” is employed. Specific scalar 
and vector examples are included to illustrate the theory. 0 1987 Academic Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There have been several publications [4, 12, 13, 18, 191 on suboptimal 
feedback policies which are easily on-line implemented and which give a 
value for the performance index close to the truly optimal. The structure of 
the feedback policies are decided a priori from the point of view of on-line 
realization. 
References [24, 25, 311 deal with suboptimal control of linear systems. 
Leondes and Shieh [16] developed a suboptimal control function for the 
time-varying linear tracking system with multiple time delays. Sokolov 
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[30] proposed an adaptive suboptimal control of a linear discrete system 
with unknown parameters. Yaz [36] considered the receding-horizon con- 
trol laws with finite final-state penalization matrices for linear discrete-time 
systems. Sardis [27] developed global suboptimal feedback solutions for a 
class of nonlinear control systems. 
Lee et al. [ 151 and Chan and Zarrop [6] studied the suboptimal control 
of stochastic systems. Toivonen discussed the suboptimal control of 
stochastic systems with linear input constraints [32] as well as an 
amplitude constraint on the input [33]. Pervozanskii and Solonina [23] 
and Bernstein and Hyland [3] discussed finite-dimensional controllers for 
distributed systems. 
Kim and Shin [ 1 l] applied a suboptimal method for controlling 
manipulators. Zakzouk et al. [37] employed a microprocessor as a real- 
time controller to control the first-order stochastic system. Yamada et al. 
[34] used the microcomputer for the suboptimal control of a roof crane. 
Eltimsahy et al. [7] utilized a subopitmal controller for a hybrid solar 
energy system. Kumar et al. [ 141 discussed case studies for suboptimal 
AGC regulator design for a two-area hydrothermal power system. Saridis 
et al. [28] proposed a new suboptimal control system for the Puma robot 
arm. 
Zaremba [38] investigated a two-person zero-sum differential game with 
general type phase constraints and terminal cost function. Borisenko [S] 
analyzed a quasilinear two-person differential game with a vector quality 
criterion while Lipcsey [ 171 presented nonlinear n-person differential 
games with incomplete information. Yavin [35], Gaidov [S], and Bagchi 
and Olsder [l] resorted to numerical methods for the optimal control of 
stochastic differential games. The concepts of cooperation and threat are 
used by Haurie et al. [9], while Pachter [21] and Ishida and Shimemura 
[lo] employed the concepts of incentives in differential games. 
Unlike the above publications, this paper addresses uboptimal control 
laws for bargaining among the players in differential games. The concept of 
bargaining introduced in this paper will be useful to determine whether it 
pays even to consider the implementation of suboptimal control policies. 
The “bargaining matrix” concept introduced in this paper can be used by 
players in deciding a mutually agreeable “negotiated” payoff which is a 
function of the storage facilities of each player. Ordinarily the storage 
facilities for each player are limited and the players actually want to switch 
their controls to constant feedback gains whenever possible; each player 
may want to show, initially at least, to the other player that he is capable 
of implementing the nonconstant gain controls. Concepts such as 
negotiation, bargaining, and side payments between players may be 
beneficial to both. For example, the minimizing player may realize his 
limitations, such as his cost of implementing nonconstant gains and/or his 
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lack of technical knowhow; then he might induce the other player to use 
constant gains by giving a fraction of his nonconstant payoff as a side 
payment. This side payment may be a function of the bargaining matrix 
and also of the storage facilities of the other player. The players may agree 
on a negotiated payoff where an intermediate agency, say the government 
may come into the picture; and any player who does not comply with the 
rules of the agreement may be heavily penalized. The element of cheating 
also enters the picture; for example, with a conservative approach, the first 
player might not announce his full storage capabilities and the other honest 
player may in fact agree to use constant feedback gains. In such a case, the 
net payoff will be less advantageous to the second player even though the 
bargaining matrix might show a better payoff for him. Again there is 
flexibility for each player in his choice of intervals of constant or non- 
constant feedback gains. Each player may try to confuse the other player 
by selecting his controls in a random manner depending upon his storage 
capabilities. The approach used in this paper is a natural extension of 
results [12] available in one-sided optimal control theory. 
2. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM 
Consider a dynamic system represented by 
k=Fx+G,u+G,v, (1) 
where 
x is an II x 1 state vector, 
F is an n x n matrix, 
G 1 is an n x p matrix, 
G2 is an n x q matrix, 
u is a p x 1 control vector, and 
v is a q x 1 control vector. 
The functions F, G,, and G2 are assumed to be piecewise continuous 
functions of time with a finite number of jump discontinuities during the 
interval t, to T. 
The cost function J is a quadratic function of the state vector and 
controls: 
J=x’(T)Sx(T)+~T(x’Qx+u’R~u+v’R~v)dt, 
kl 
(2) 
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where 
S is an n x n symmetric constant nonnegative-definite matrix, 
Q is an n x n symmetric nonnegative-definite matrix, 
R, is a p xp symmetric positive-definite matrix, 
R2 is a q x q symmetric negative-definite matrix. 
The entries of Q, R, , and R, are assumed to be piecewise continuous 
functions of time with a finite number of jump discontinuities during the 
interval t, to T. 
Two different suboptimal control laws are considered for u and v. The 
first suboptimal control laws u, and v1 are defined as follows: 
u, = 2 Uj(l) A:‘x (3) 
and 
v, = 2 pj(t) B(x, (4) 
I 
where 
and 
A:‘= [O-J, j = 1, 2, . . . . m, (5) 
&= [O], j= 1,2, . . . . m2, (6) 
and where acj( t),s and pj(t)‘s are scalar functions of specified form. A% and 
Bj’s are constant matrices of appropriate dimensions and are to be 
determined to satisfy the following performance index. 
J(u~,v,)~J(u’:,v~)~Jtu,,v~), (7) 
where II’: and vy are suboptimal controls constrained by (3~(6) and J is 
defined by Eq. (2). Similarly, the second suboptimal control laws u1 and v2 
are 
u2=Tyj(t) Al;x (8) 
and 
v2 = 2 dj(t) Bl;x, 
1 
(9) 
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where 
A/; = [O], j = 1, 2, . ..) S1 
and 
lq= [O], j = 1, 2, . ..) s* 
(10) 
(11) 
and where y,(t)% and dj(t)‘s are scalar functions of specified form. Ai’s and 
B{‘s are constant matrices of appropriate dimensions and are to be 
determined to satisfy the performance index: 
Jwi, v2) Q -quy, v2) <J(u,, v;), (12) 
where II: and vi are suboptimal controls constrained by Eqs. (8)-( 11) and J 
is stated by Eq. (2). 
The problem is to find or characterize an expression, if it exists, for the 
difference in payoff J(uy, vy) - J(ui, vi), when the players use two different 
suboptimal controls. This will determine which suboptimal control strategy 
is advantageous to either player. It may be noted that either player may 
select to use an unconstrained nonconstant gain feedback strategy. 
3. APPLICABLE RESULTS 
A. Linear Differential Game without Constant-Gain Constraints 
The linear differential game without the constraints (3)-(6) or (8~( 11) 
has been considered by Baron [2] and Rhodes [26]; the results are 
u’(t)= -R;‘(t) G;(t) P(r) x(t) (13) 
v’(t)= -R,‘(t) G;(t) P(t) x(t), (14) 
where P(t) satisfies the matrix Ricatti equation 
P+FP+PF-P(G,R;~G;+G,R,~G;)P+Q=[~] (15) 
with the boundary condition P(T) = S. The cost from time to to terminal 
time T of using these feedback controls is 
J[uO, v”] = x’( to) P( to) x( to). (16) 
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B. Linear Differential Game with Constant Gain Constraints 
The linear differential game with the constraints (3)-(6) (or (7)-(10)) 
has been considered by [ 18-201; the results are 
R, 2 a,A{ + G;P,] xx’ dt= [0], k= 1, 2, . . . . m, (17) 
j=l 
R, 2 fljB:‘+G;P, xx’dt=[O], 1 k = 1, 2, . . . . m2 (18) j=l 
j,+P, F+G, F ajA{+G, T pjB( 
j=l j=l 
+ 
( 
F+ !$ a,A{+G, 2 fijB{ 
) 
’ P, 
j= 1 j= 1 
+(j!l liaiy Rl (j!l ajai) 
+(~~~BiBi)R*(,T~BiBi)+Q=[Ol 
with the boundary condition P,(T) = S. 
The optimal cost Jo is given by 
Jo = x’(to) P,(b) x(t,). 
(19) 
(20) 
4. SUBOPTIMAL COSTS 
As discussed in the previous section, the optimal performance index for 
linear-quadratic games depends on the initial state vector and on the initial 
value of the matrix P, which satisfies the matrix Riccati equation (15) for 
nonconstant feedback gains and (19) for suboptimal controls given by (3) 
and (4). In this section, an expression for the difference of the P(to))s is 
derived when the players use two different suboptimal controls. The 
procedure parallels the one adopted by Kleinman and Athans [ 121 for the 
corresponding one-sided optimal control problem. 
Consider a linear dynamic system given by (1) and a cost functional 
given by (2). The two suboptimal gains to be considered are defined as 
follows: 
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A, = 3 ctj(t)A: (21) 
j=l 
A*= f y,(t)Ai, (22) 
j=l 
B, = 3 pi(t) B{ (23) 
j=l 
a 
B,= c hi(t) Bi. (24) 
j= 1 
Let 
F,w=F+G,A1+G2B1 (25) 
FN2=F+G1A2+G2B2. (26) 
It is evident from Section 3 that the following relations are to be satisfied 
for optimality: 
~,+P,F,,+F~,P,+A;R,A,+B;R,B,+Q=C~~ (27) 
with the boundary condition P(T) = S, and 
with the boundary condition P(T) = S. Therefore, 
P1=-P,F,,-FN,P,-~;R,~,-B;R,B,-Q. 
From Eqs. (25) and (26), 
F,, = F,, + G,(A, - AJ + GAB, - Bd 
(29) 
(30) 
and 
FN,P,= ((A,-A,)'G;+(B,-B,)'G;)P,+FN,P, 
P,F,~=P,FN~+P~CG~(A~-A~)+G~(BI-B~)I. (31) 
Substituting (30) and (31) in (29), 
i’,= -F&P,-P,F,,-AA;R,A,-B;R,B,-Q 
- [(A, -A,)’ G; + (B, - B2)’ G;] P, 
- P,CGI(A, -A,) + GAB, -WI. (32) 
STRATEGIES IN DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 163 
From Eq. (28), 
i’,= -F’NzP,-PZFNZ-A;R,AZ-B;RZB2-Q. (33) 
Subtracting (33) from (32) 
&fj=drj(t)=-F’,,(P,-P,)-(PI-P,)F,,+A;R,A,-A;R,A, 
+ B;R2B2-B;R2B1-[(A,-A2)‘G;+(B1-B2)’G;] P, 
- P,CG1(A, -A,) + GAB, -&)I. (34) 
Equation (34) can be rewritten as 
b?(t)= -F,,hP-dPF,,-(A,-A,)‘R,(A,-A,) 
- (B, - W MB, - BJ - (A, - A,)‘(GP, + R, AJ 
-(B, - BZ)‘(G;P1 + R,B,)- (G; P, + R,A,)‘(A, - AJ 
- (G; P, + R, B2)‘( B, - B2). (35) 
Because P,(T) = Pz( T) = S, 
6P(T) = [O] (36) 
It can be shown that the matrix differential equation 
t= -FL-LF+GU (37) 
with boundary condition L(T) has the solution 
L(f)=b’(K f)L(T) 4(T f,-~‘V(G t) G(z) U(T)~(G f) & (38) I 
where $( t, to) is the transition matrix corresponding to F(t). Therefore 
d(t, to) = F(t) 4(f, b), 4th to) = Z (39) 
and 
&to, f) = -4th 1) F(t), 4th to) = 1. (40) 
These results are used in Eq. (35) to obtain 
BP(t)=J‘~m;(r,f,C(A,-A,)‘R,(A,-A,) f 
+ (B, -B,)‘R*(B,-B*)+(A1-A*)‘(G;P1+R1Az) 
+ (B, - BZ)‘(G;P1 + R2B2) + (G; P, + R,A,)‘(A, -Ad 
+ (GP, + R,B,)‘(B, - &)I MT, t) & (41) 
where &(t, to) is the transition matrix corresponding to FN2(t). 
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Another expression for U(r) can be found by interchanging the sub- 
scripts in Eq. (41) and multiplying the resulting expression by - 1: 
Wf)= j=@Az, t)C-(A,-A,)‘R,(A,-A,) f 
- (B,-B,)‘R,(B,-B,)+(A,-A*)‘(G;P,+R,A,) 
+(B,-B,)'(G',Pz+R,B,)+(G',P,+R,.4,)'(A,-A,) 
+ (G;Pz + &B~)‘(BI -WI ACT, t) &. (42) 
Yet another form of dP(r) which is used in the next section is obtained 
from the following identities: 
G;P,+R,A,=(G;P,+R,A,)+R,(A,-A,) 
G;P,+R,B,=(G;P,+R,B,)+R,(B,-B,). 
Therefore, 
(A,-A,)'(G;P,+R,A,)=(A,-A,)'(G;P,+R,A,) 
+ (A, -AJ'R,(A, -AZ) (43) 
(B,-B,)'(G;P,+R,B,)=(B,-B,)'(G;P,+R,B,) 
+ (B, - W' MB, - 6) (44) 
(G;P,+R,A,)'(A,-A,)=(G;P,+R,A*)(A,-A*) 
+ (A,-Ad'R,(AI-AJ (45) 
(G;Pz+RZB,)'(BI-Bd=(G;PZ+RZBZ)I(B,-Bd 
+ (B, - &I' MB, - Bd (46) 
Substituting (43)-(46) in (42), the result is 
WI= jl)‘h, t)CV, -Ad’R1V, -A,)+(Bl -B,)‘RAB, -4) I 
+ (A,-A,)'(G;P,+R,A,)+(B,-B,)'(G;P,+R,B,) 
+ (G;P,+R,A,)'(A,-A,) 
+ (GP, + R, &)‘(BI -WI d,(z, t) dz. (47) 
Equation (47) is a general expression for the difference in cost of 
implementing two different suboptimal gains. An expression for the dif- 
ference between a suboptimal cost and the nonconstant saddle point payoff 
is derived in the next section. 
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5. ADVANTAGEOUS STRATEGIES 
If we assume that A, and B2 correspond to optimal unconstrained con- 
trols and A, and B, correspond to suboptimal constrained-gain controls, 
then 
AJt)=A;(f)= -Ry’G;P2 
B,(t)=B,*(t)= -R;’ G;P2, 
(48) 
(49) 
where P*(f) satisfies (15). Therefore, 
G;P,+R,A,=[O] 
G;P,+R,B,=[O]; 
(50) 
(51) 
with (50) and (51), (47) gives 
WQ=\Tl;(r, f)C(A,-A:)‘R,(A,-A:) , 
+ (B, -Z)’ MB, - B:)l h(z, f) dz. (52) 
Whether the suboptimal controls A, and B, are advantageous to one 
player or the other, with respect o the nonconstant saddle point payoff is 
determined by (52): namely, if 6P(t,) is greater than zero, then the sub- 
optimal controls specified by Eqs. (22) and (23) are advantageous to the 
maximizing player and vice versa. 
It is evident from Eq. (52) that hP(t,) = 0 if A, = A: and B, = B:. But it 
is to be noted that because the integrand of Eq. (52) consists of a positive 
definite term and a negative definite term, the integral can become zero 
even ifA,#A: and B,#B:. 
The above discussion can be illustrated by the following geometric 
argument. Let u denote the optimal saddle point pay-off, b the payoff when 
the minimizing player uses suboptimal control while the maximizing player 
uses optimal control, c the payoff when the maximizing player uses sub- 
optimal control while the minimizing player uses optimal control, and d 
the payoff when both the players use suboptimal control. Also, let II* and 
v* denote the truly optimal controls. Therefore, 
qu*, v*) = a 
J(A,x,v*)=b 
J(u*, B, x) = c 
J(A,x, B,x)=d. 
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It is evident from saddle point theory that 
and 
Therefore, d can lie anywhere between b and c and whether it is greater 
than a or less than a is actually determined by (52). 
Sufftcient conditions for advantageous trategies are derived next for the 
game with a time-invariant system and when the players use constant feed- 
back gains. 
6. SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS: TIME INVARIANT SYSTEM 
(CONSTANT FEEDBACK GAINS) 
Scalar Case 
It can be seen from Eqs. ( 17) and (18) that for a time-invariant system 
under the constraint of constant feedback gains, 
A _ GjP,x’dt 
1 R, Jx’dt (53) 
and 
B 
1 
= -dP,x*dt 
R, sx2dt 
from which 
A,GzR, 
B, =G,R~. (54) 
Consider the term within brackets of (52): 
(A, -A:)’ R,(A, -A:) + (B, -B:)’ R,(B, -B:) 
= (A,-AA:)2R,+(B,-BB:)2R, 
= A;R1+B:R2-2A1A$R,-2B,B;R2+(A:)2 R1+(B;)2 Rz (55) 
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in which 
A; = -2P2, 
I 
B:= -$P2, 
2 
and the results of (54) are used to obtain 
(G:R, + G; R,)(AR, + P,G,)2 
G:R,R, 
3 
which is equivalent to the right-hand member of (55). Therefore, 
w4d=j T4:(~, to)W: R2 + G;R,)Wh + WA2 dt 
10 G:R, & 
Because Gf R, R2 is always negative, it is evident that constant feedback 
gains will be advantageous to the maximizing player if and only if 
G: R, + Gz R, < 0 or Gf/R, + GYR, > 0 and vice versa for the minimizing 
player. 
It is evident that the quantity Gf/R, + GyR2 would certainly be a 
deciding factor for the negotiated performance index in the case that the 
players bargain to adopt constant feedback gains. 
Vector Case 
Again it can be seen from Eqs. (17) and (18) that for a time-invariant 
system, 
A,= -R;‘G;[(t,, T) W-l@,, T) (56) 
B, = -R;‘G;l(t,, T) I+-‘&,, T), (57) 
where 
and 
W(to, T) P IT xx’ dt 
Gl 
<(to, T) ii j-r P,xx’ dt 
then 
A; = - R;‘G; P*(t) (58) 
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and 
B; = -R; l G; P*(t). (59) 
Substituting (56)-(59) in (52) and simplifying, it follows that 
SP(t,)=[‘cj;(r, t)(<W-‘-P,)‘(G,R;‘G;+G,R;‘G;) 
10 
x (<w-l -P*) &(T, t) dz. (60) 
Therefore, the maximizing player will be at an advantage if (G, R; l G; + 
G2 RF’ G;) > 0 and vice versa for the minimizing player. If (G, R; l G; + 
G,R;‘G;) is indefinite, however, nothing can be said as to which player 
is benefited by the use of constant feedback gains unless the optimal gains 
are computed and substituted in Eq. (52). Conditions for which 
G1 RF l G; + G, R; ’ G; might become indefinite for a special case in which 
either G, R; ’ G; or Gz R; * G; is nonsingular is given in the next section. 
By restricting that the same information be available to both players, 
partial information about the possible initial conditions can also be 
accounted for by proper interpretation of 5 and W matrices. In this case, 
Eqs. (56) and (57) are to be satisfied in an expected value sense, the expec- 
tation operators being taken over the distributed initial states. This is 
because, for the class of linear-quadratic games under consideration [IS], 
the operation of taking the expected values of the necessary conditions for 
optimality corresponding to known initial values, is equivalent to finding 
the necessary conditions for optimality with respect to the expected value 
ofJ. 
It is clear that if G, R; l G; + G, RF’ G; equal zero, P, and P, satisfy the 
same differential equation 
P+PF+F’P+Q=[O] 
with the boundary condition P(T) = S and the system equation reduces to 
for the nonconsant case and also for the constant feedback case. 
It is also clear that if the players decide to negotiate the use of constant 
feedback gains, the. negotiations will certainly depend upon 
G,R;‘G;+G,R;‘G;, and hence the matrix G,R;‘G;+G2R~‘G; may 
rightly be named as the bargaining matrix. 
Care should be exercised in determining advantageous strategies, in 
regard to whether the problem is well posed in the saddle point sense; 
namely, whether there exists a closed-loop nonconstant saddle point 
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solution. It is well known [2,29] that there exists a closed-loop saddle 
point solution for the unconstrained-gain linear-quadratic game under 
consideration if and only if 
T 
c$(T,t)(G,R,‘G;+G,R;‘G;)@‘(T,t)c’dt #O, 1 
tE [to, Tl, (61) 
where S= c’c and $(t, to) is the transition matrix corresponding to F. In 
other words, there exists a closed-loop saddle point solution if and ony if 
Q,(t) # - 1 for all t E [to, T], where Q,(t) are the eigenvalues of the matrix 
s T c$(T, t)(G1R,‘G;+G2R;‘G;)$‘(T, t)c’dt. I 
If (G, R; l G; + G, RF’ G;) > 0, clearly each Qi(t) > 0. Hence, a saddle 
point solution exists for the unconstrained-gain game whenever constant 
feedback gains are advantageous to the maximizing player. On the other 
hand, if G, RF l G; + G2R;’ G; < 0, the pertinent saddle point solution 
exists only for a specified interval determined by (61). These facts are 
illustrated by numerical examples in Section 8. 
7. INDEFINITENESS OF THE BARGAINING MATRIX 
A test for the indefiniteness of the bargaining matrix is formulated for the 
special case when G, R;‘G; or G,R;‘G; is nonsingular. Without loss of 
generality, it is assumed that G, R;‘G; is nonsingular. Then according to a 
theorem [22] concerned with the simultaneous reduction of two quadratic 
forms, there exists a nonsingular real matrix M such that 
and 
M’GIR;‘G;M=Z (62) 
M’G2R;‘G;M=diag(r,,r,, . . . . r,,), (63) 
where for any choice of M, the quantities rl, r2, . . . . r,, are necessarily the 
roots of the polynomial equation 
lxG,R;‘G;-GZRzlG;I =O. (64) 
Equations (62) and (63) give 
M’(G,R;‘G;+G2R,‘G;)M=diag(l+r,, l+r,,..., l+r,). (65) 
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Because R2 is negative definite, it is necessary that ri 6 0, i = 1, 2, . . . . n. 
Therefore, the negotiation matrix for the special case of G, R; l G; being 
nonsingular is indefinite if and only if there exist roots rl and rZ to the 
polynomial equation IxG, R;‘G; - G,R;‘G;J = 0 such that (rl I < 1 < Ir,l. 
8. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
A. Scalar Case: Advantageous to the Maximizing Player 
Consider the case of a linear time-invariant system governed by 
R = -0.5x + 1.25~ + 1.5v, x0 = 2. 
The quadratic cost functional is 
(66) 
J = x(T)* S + J;‘*’ (u* - 4v2 + 2x2) dr. (67) 
By assuming different values to the a,(t)% and /Ii(t)‘s, we can have dif- 
ferent suboptimal controls for each player. Figure 1 shows the variation of 
u = (A0 f ,Alt)x 
" = (6" + Blt)x 
" = Ax 
v truly optimal 
8. u = (A0 + Alt)x 
v truly optimal 
, 
u truly optimal 
v = Bx 
..I c u = (A0 + Alt + A/)x v truly optimal 
u truly optimal 
v truly optimal 
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Parameter S 
FIG. 1. Variation of performance index. 
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performance index when various types of suboptimal controls are 
employed. It is seen that the variation of the performance index from the 
truly optimal saddle point value is greatly reduced if we assume 
u=(A,+A,t)x and u=(B,+B,t)x. 
The bargaining matrix is 
s+z= l.O>O. 
1 2 
Hence, for the specific scalar system considered, constant feedback gains 
are always advantageous to the maximizing player as also seen in Fig. 1. 
From Section 5, it is evident that unconstrained-gain saddle point solutions 
always exist for the specific game under consideration. 
B. Scalar Case: Advantageous to the Minimizing Player 
Consider the case of a linear time-invariant system governed by 
it= -osx+u+ 1.5u, x(J = 2.0. (68) 
The cost functional is 
J=x2(T)+[; (u2 - 2u2 + x2) dt. (69) 
The bargaining matrix is 
: z+g= -0.125<0. 
1 2 
For the existence of an unconstrained saddle point solution we have, from 
(61), 
1+jre2(T, tJ(q+q),#O on [to, T] 
I 
or 
l-0.125 Tep’T-r)dt$O s on Cb, Tl f 
or 
1 -0.125(1 -e”-T’)#O on Cb, Tl. (70) 
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Since 1 - e”- ‘) > 0 and < 1, an unconstrained saddle point solution exists 
for all T. In this case constant feedback gains are advantageous to the 
minimizing player. The results are given below for T= 1.0: 
Performance index = 7.2727 without gain constraints; 
Performance index = 7.2532 with gain constraints; 
Optimal parameters: A = - 1.4939 and B = 1.1204. 
C. Vector Case 
Consider the case of a linear time-invariant system governed by 
where u and u are scalar controls. The quadratic cost functional is 
x’(T)[; ;]x(T)+,,’ (xf+0.5u2-4v’)dt. 
First it is assumed that the initial conditions are known to be 
[:::l=[Z]- 
(71) 
(72) 
(73) 
The optimal feedback gains and the performance index are computed. 
Next the feedback gains that are independent of the initial conditions are 
computed, as also are the average performance index and the actual perfor- 
mance index resulting from use of these feedback gains when the initial 
conditions are given by Eq. (73). In computing the above feedback gains, it 
is assumed that E(&) = E(x&,) and that xl0 and x2o are independent. 
It is then assumed that partial information about the initial conditions 
are known-two cases are considered. In the first case it is assumed that 
E(x:,) = 16E(xz,) and in the second case, x10 = 4x,,. The bargaining matrix 
is 
G,R;‘G;+G,R;‘c;=[;]2[0 l]-[;I;[0 2,=[; ;]a~. 
Hence, constant feedback gains for this specific example are always 
advantageous to the maximizing player as Table 1 clearly illustrates. 
9. CONCLUSION 
Consideration has been given to suhicient conditions for advantageous 
strategies in linear-quadratic games. This effort is by no means complete. It 
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TABLE I 
Results for a Vector Case (Constant Feedback Gains) 
Actual 
Gain initial Performance 
Case conditions Design information conditions Optimal gains index 
1 
2 
u truly 
optimal 
” truly 
optimal 
u = Ax Initial conditions 
o=Bx included in the 
design 
u = Ax E(x,s2) = E(x2s2) 
u=Bx m,ox2LJ = 0 
u = Ax E(x,,~) = 16E(~,,~) 
v=Bx W,o%o) = 0 
u=Ax xl0 = 4~2~ 
v=Bx 
u truly 
optimal 
v truly 
optimal 
7 
8 
9 
10 
u = Ax Initial conditions 
v=Bx included in the 
design 
u=Ax E(x,02) = %202) 
v=Bx -w,ox20) = 0 
u = Ax E(xlo2) = 16E(~,~) 
v=Bx E(x,ox,o) = 0 
u=Ax x,0 = -4x,, 
v=Bx 
X ,a = 2.0 A(r)= -R;‘G;P(t) J= 14.0195 
x20 = 0.5 B(t)= -R;‘G;P(t) 
x,0 = 2.0 A = C-3.4825 -4.33711 J= 14.0867 
x20 = 0.5 B = [ 0.8706 1.08431 
x‘o = 2.0 
x20 = 0.5 
x,0 = 2.0 
xzo = 0.5 
x,0 = 2.0 
x2o = 0.5 
x,0 = -2.0 
X 20 = 0.5 
x,0 = -2.0 
X 20 = 0.5 
x,0 = -2.0 
x20 = 0.5 
x,0 = -2.0 
x20 = 0.5 
x,0 = -2.0 
x2o = 0.5 
A= C-3.2786 -3.77761 J= 14.1215 
B= [ 0.8196 0.94443 
A = [ -3.6166 -4.37881 J= 14.0988 
B= [ 0.9041 1.09471 
Same as 2 Same as 2 
A(t)= -R;‘G;P(r) J= 7.4371 
B(t)= -R;‘G;P(t) 
P(f)from Eq. (15) 
A= C-3.766 -4.39511 J=7.4810 
B= [ 0.9415 1.09881 
Same as 3 J= 7.5047 
Same as 4 J = 7.4876 
Same as 7 Same as 7 
has been shown that for linear-quadratic time-invariant games, in general, 
a sufficient condition for constant feedback gains to be advantageous to the 
maximizing player is that the bargaining matrix G, R; ' G; + G, R; ' G; > 0. 
This condition is also true for games in which only partial information 
about the possible initial conditions is available and different for each 
player. Rules of negotiation, bargaining, side payments, etc. are matters for 
further investigation. 
It is suggested that the problem of differential games with constant feed- 
back gains might be reformulated in a Hilbert space and be analyzed using 
functional analysis techniques. Such a reformulation could simultaneously 
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consider such system types as linear discrete-time systems and linear 
distributed-parameter systems. 
It is also suggested that attention be given to sensitivity considerations in 
differential games. For example, one would like to know the effect of 
variations in the weighting matrices of the dynamical system and of the 
cost functional on the saddle point and on the performance index. The 
approach and results of this paper might be useful in this respect. 
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